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 ABSTRACT: The arrest and prosecution in 1945 of a small group of London anarchists 10 
 associated with the radical anti-militarist and anti-war publication WarCommentary 11 
 at first appears to be a surprising and anomalous set of events, given that this group 12 
 was hitherto considered to be too marginal and lacking in influence to raise official 13 
 concern. This article argues that in the closing months of World War II the British 14 
 government decided to suppress War Commentary because officials feared that its 15 
 polemic might foment political turmoil and thwart postwar policy agendas as mili- 16 
 tary personnel began to demobilize and reassert their civilian identities. For a short 17 
 period of time, in an international context of “demobilization crisis”, anarchist anti- 18 
 militarist polemic became a focus of both state fears of unrest and a public sphere 19 
 fearing ongoing military regulation of public affairs. Analysing the positions taken 20 
 by the anarchists and government in the course of the events leading to the prose- 21 
 cution of the editors of War Commentary, the article will draw on “warfare-state” 22 
 revisions to the traditional “welfare-state” historiography of the period for a more 23 
 comprehensive view of the context of these events. 24 
25 
At the beginning of 1945, shortly before the war ended, a small group of 26 
London anarchists associated with the radical anti-militarist and anti-war 27 
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publication War Commentary were arrested and prosecuted. Given that 28 
this group was hitherto considered to be too marginal and uninfluential to 29 
raise official concern, this at first appears to be a surprising and anomalous 30 
set of events. The government decision to suppress a minor publication 31 
at such a late stage in the war using controversial emergency legislation 32 
has been described as “rather curious” and “difficult to understand” by 33 
commentators.
1 
34 
 War Commentary was an anarchist paper published by the Freedom 35 
Press group in London between 1939 and 1945. Whilst the bulk of the 36 
British socialist movement in the mid-twentieth century was effectively 37 
structured by the choice between the Labour Party and the Communist 38 
Party,
2 
the Freedom Press group belonged within an archipelago of 39 
groupings on the left that polemicized against both Moscow and the British 
40 
Labour leadership. This included remnants of interwar pacifist socialist 41 
movements, the Anti-Parliamentary Communist Foundation (APCF) 42 
associated with Glasgow anarchist Guy Aldred, and others such as Sylvia 43 
Pankhurst’s Communist Workers’ Party (CWP).3 The Freedom Press 44 
group and Aldred’s Glasgow anarchists opposed World War II along anti- 45 
state and anti-capitalist lines. Allied and Axis powers were understood to be 
46 
defending militarized capitalist hierarchies whether they called themselves 
47 
fascist or not. Anarchist groups such as these pointed to the plight of the 48 
republicans in the Spanish Civil War in particular in order to cast serious 49 
doubt on the sincerity of the British establishment’s hostility to fascism. 50 
Links between the various anti-parliamentary groups, left communists, 51 
anarchists, and war resisters were established in meetings such as the 52 
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Workers’ Open Forum, advertised by the APCF as “a workers' council for 53 
eliminating error” and addressed by independent radicals, anarchists, 54 
 socialists, members of the Peace Pledge Union, and others.4 55 
British officials pursued conflicting policies towards the activities of War 56 
Commentary during the war. Despite the virulent anti-war stance of the 57 
paper, the government was reluctant to engage in overt censorship of the 58 
anarchists until April 1945, when it drew on the full force of the available 59 
wartime defence regulations to curtail their publishing activities. At the 60 
height of the strategic bombing campaign in Germany the authorities had 61 
been carefully monitoring the material which appeared in War Commentary. 
62 
At this point, however, the government had decided not to invoke any 63 
special measures (or emergency powers) to suppress a group which had not 
64 
seemed to pose a credible threat either to the war effort or to public order on 
65 
the home front. Among other things, the government had been concerned 66 
about the possible publicity that a crackdown on an otherwise obscure 67 
movement might produce. However, when the war was in its final stages, 68 
the government’s attitude toward censoring anarchist propaganda changed 69 
2. I include those non-communist forces on and to Labour's left such as the Independent 
LabourParty (ILP), and the Trotskyist elements inside and outside the Communist Party, 
although these, admittedly, also wished to offer an alternative to both official communism and 
Labour Party policies. 
3. See Mark Shipway, Anti-Parliamentary Communism: The Movement for Workers' Councils in 
Britain, 1917–1945 (Basingstoke, 1988). See also the following documentation of political 
materials: Wildcat Group, Class War on the Home Front! Revolutionary Opposition to the 
Second World War (Manchester, 1986). 
4. The Peace Pledge Union (PPU) is a British pacifist non-governmental organization 
establishedby Dick Sheppard in 1934. Regarding the Workers' Open Forum see Shipway, 
AntiParliamentary Communism, ch. 8. 
significantly. As this article will show in detail, the authorities decided to 70 
begin acting against the British anarchists in late 1944 because they were 71 
concerned that the revolutionary messages being disseminated in the pages 72 
of War Commentary might find a much wider and more receptive audience 73 
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once the fighting ended and soldiers began returning home. 74 
The apparent change in policy towards the anarchists should be viewed in 75 
the context of official fears about the potential political turmoil associated 76 
with the endings of wars in which civilian populations had been mobilized 77 
into a military establishment. Tensions and fears associated with the process 78 
of demobilization after World War II have rarely been highlighted in British 79 
social and political histories. Nonetheless, military demobilization was 80 
socially fraught and politically controversial. 81 
Globally, the two world wars had a profound impact on the temporal 82 
pattern of worker dissent. Using a key database on world labour unrest, 83 
Beverly Silver has demonstrated that the years following the endings of the 84 
two world wars coincided with the “two highest peaks in overall world 85 
labor unrest” since 1870, these being periods of “explosive world-scale 86 
outbreaks of labor militancy”.5 The period following World War I had 87 
demonstrated the potential for social unrest surrounding the management 88 
of mass demobilization to coalesce into mutinous dissention. Across 89 
Europe, citizen-soldiers had returned home armed with weapons and 90 
revolutionary ideas to foment rebellion and revolution. Insubordination 91 
and “whiffs of revolutionary ferment” broke out in hundreds of British 92 
Army camps following World War I. In 1919 over 10,000 soldiers on leave 93 
in Folkestone refused to embark on troopships returning them to France, a 94 
patrol vessel at Milford Haven raised the Red Flag, and Calais was overrun 95 
by striking military personnel.
6 
Given the historical precedent, the 96 
government was sensitive to potential problems around demobilization. 97 
These events, both the anarchist activities and the government response 98 
to them, reveal a less consensual relationship between state and society in 99 
the period than is usually perceived to be the case. The historiographical 100 
consensus about the British people at war has traditionally centred around 101 
the notion of a nation united across class in solidarity and community. 102 
Richard Titmuss’s Problems of Social Polity, published in 1950, portrayed a 103 
level of wartime social solidarity that he claimed laid the groundwork for 104 
postwar welfarism.
7 
The first major challenge to this orthodoxy was Angus 105 
Calder’s social history of wartime Britain, The People’s War, which used the 106 
recently rediscovered wartime material of Mass Observation to present a 107 
5. Beverly L. Silver, Forces of Labour: Workers’ Movements and Globalization Since 1870 
(Cambridge, 2003), pp. 125, 131 
6. Stephen Graubard, “Demobilization in Great Britain following the First World War”, The 
Journal of Modern History, 19:4 (1947), p. 4. 
7. Richard Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (London, 1950). 
picture of life in wartime Britain that included panic, looting, class conflict, 
108 xenophobia, strikes, and absenteeism.
8 
The popular image of national 
unity 109 against the foe was criticized as a myth, with strikes commonplace, 
the 110 government often unpopular, and Churchill frequently disparaged.
9 
111 
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Further revisions, for example Paul Addison’s The Road to 1945, detailed 112 
a range of political tensions in wartime Britain.
10 
Nonetheless, the popular, 
113 mainstream view of the war has proved consistently resilient to these 114 
challenges and revisions. David Cesarani has argued that the cultural 115 
constriction perpetrated by these myths still hampers informed national 116 
debate on matters related to the war such as the failure to prosecute Nazi 117 
collaborators and the assessment of Allied bombing strategies.
11 
One con- 118 
sequence of this constricted national debate is that mainstream histories of 
119 the period tend to obscure the tensions between government and serving 
120 personnel that were a marked feature of the later months of the war – an 
121 obfuscation that makes government sensitivity to the anarchist 
commentary 122 of these months difficult to understand.
12 
123 
Anarchism offers a particular interpretation of the relationship between 124 
state and society underlying warfare between nations. Scott Turner, in 125 a 
recent edited collection of work to emerge from the field of anarchist 126 
studies, notes that in this tradition the words “governmental” and “military” 
127 are often used synonymously. Anarchists reject the legitimacy of war 128 
because they resist the very idea of state sovereignty.
13 
So, whilst anarchism 
129 historically encompasses a variety of opinions on the use of violence as a 
130 revolutionary strategy, its stance on war between nation states is 
generally 131 consistently hostile. It is a philosophy that endorses horizontal 
models of 132 political engagement and envisions a social order that is 
sustained and 133 coordinated without coercion or enforcement. Anarchist 
anti-militarism, 134 questioning war and the state together, attacks the 
politically centralized 135 
8. Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain 1939–1945 (London, 1969). 
9. For discussion of popular objections to Allied bombing strategies, and the anarchist voice in 
thesecontroversies, see Carissa Honeywell, A British Anarchist Tradition (London, 2013), pp. 
84–88. 
10. Paul Addison, The Road to 1945 (London, 1975). 
11. David Cesarani, “Lacking in Conviction: British War Crimes Policy and National Memory of 
the Second World War”, in Martin Evans and Ken Lunn (eds) War and Memory in the 
Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1997), pp. 27–44, 27–28. 
12. For fundamental revisionist interventions on the relations between government and population, 
respectively government and soldiers, see also Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London, 
1991); Clive Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality (Chigaco, IL, 1991). For more recent analyses 
see Donald Thomas, The Enemy Within: Hucksters, Racketeers, Deserters and Civilians during 
the Second World War (New York, 2003); David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970 
(Cambridge, 2006). David Edgerton is also the author of England and the Aeroplane: An Essay 
on a Militant and Technological Nation; Science, Technology and the British Industrial 
“Decline”, 1870–1970 (London, 2013). 
13. Scott Turner, “Anarchist Theory and Human Rights”, in Nathan J. Jun and Shane Wahl (eds), 
New Perspectives on Anarchism (Lanham, MD, 2010), pp. 121–146, 136. 
character of relationships in war-ready societies as much as it resists war 136 
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itself. The anarchist editors of War Commentary applied this analysis to 137 
their critique of state policy during World War II, and to the expression of 138 
their doubts about the postwar settlement that was being shaped. 139 
This article will first outline the trial of the editors and the controversies it 140 
created. Then it will explore the position of the Freedom Press anarchists on 141 
the war. It will contextualize this position within the revisionist approach to 142 
British government and society in the mid-century period, particularly 143 
drawing on recent commentaries on the military priorities of the British 144 
state at that time. Following this, it will look at the policy of government 145 
towards the publication of War Commentary and why this changed. Lastly 146 
it will examine the issue of demobilization in an international context, 147 
focusing both on the concerns it created for the state and the opportunities 148 
it seemed to offer to the anarchists. Both the state authorities and the 149 
anarchists had a series of international examples and references in mind 150 
when considering the dangers and opportunities presented by the demo- 151 
bilization moment. It is argued here that the British government decided to 152 
suppress the publication of War Commentary because officials feared that, 153 
in the context of demobilization, such anti-militarist polemic could foment 154 
unmanageable political turmoil. 155 
‘THE STRANGE CASE OF THE THREE ANARCHISTS JAILED 156 
AT THE OLD BAILEY’
14 157 
The Freedom Press group denounced the war from the outset and persis- 158 
tently highlighted the continued existence of class privilege in wartime 159 
Britain. It was thus, according to Ward “an obvious candidate for the 160 
attentions of the Special Branch”.15 It is, however, towards the end of the 161 
war that overt interference with, and then prosecution of, the anarchists 162 
began. In fact, the Freedom Press anarchists enjoyed what Stammers terms 163 
the “dubious distinction” of being involved in one of the last “political 164 
prosecutions” of the war.16 165 
In December 1944 officers of the Special Branch, the police unit con- 166 
cerned with political and other matters of national security, raided the 167 
Freedom Press Office and the private houses of four editors and sym- 168 
pathizers. Search warrants were issued under Defence Regulation 39b 169 
which declared that no person should seduce members of the armed forces 170 
from their duty, and regulation 88a which enabled articles to be seized if 171 
14. Herbert Read, Freedom, Is it a Crime?: The Strange Case of the Three Anarchists Jailed at the 
Old Bailey, April 1945 (London, 1945). 
15. Colin Ward, “Witness for the Prosecution”, The Raven Anarchist Quarterly, 29, 8:1 (Spring 
1995). 
16. Stammers, Civil Liberties in Britain, p. 88. 
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they were evidence of the commission of such an offence. At the end of 172 
December, Special Branch officers led by Detective Inspector Whitehead, 173 
searched the belongings of soldiers in various parts of the country, including 
174 Ward at Stromness in Orkney. On 22 February 1945 Marie Louise Berneri, 
175 
Vernon Richards, and John Hewetson were arrested at 7.30 in the morning. 
176 
They were joined at the court by Philip Sansom who was brought from 177 
Brixton Prison, and the four were charged with the dissemination of three 178 
seditious issues of War Commentary under Defence Regulation 39a. 179 
They appeared four times at Marylebone Magistrates Court and their 180 
trial took four days at the Old Bailey, England’s Central Criminal Court. 181 
The evidence used in the trial included articles from War Commentary 182 
dated 1, 11, and 25 November 1944 covering spontaneous councils or 183 
soviets in post-World-War-I Germany and Russia, soldiers’ councils in the 184 
French Revolution, the British rail strike of 1919, unrest in British industry, 
185 and bad conditions in military training camps. Central to the prosecution 
186 case was a Freedom Press circular letter dated 25 October sent to sub- 187 
scribers in the military, asking contacts to introduce “new comrades” to the 188 
publication. Also presented at the trial were lists of subscribers in the forces 
189 found at the offices of Freedom Press, a manuscript signed by a number of 
190 soldiers disapproving of the government’s policy on Greece, and a leaflet 
191 
containing the following poem, entitled “Fight! What For?”: 19
2 
You are wanted for the Army, 
19
3 
Do you know what you'll have to do? 19
4 
They will tell you to murder your brothers, As 
they have been told to kill you. 
19
5 
19
7 
19
6 
19
8 
You are wanted for the Army, 19
9 
Do you know what you'll have to do? 20
0 
Just murder to save your country 
From men who are workers, like You. 
20
1 
20
3 
20
2 
20
4 
You country! Who says you've a country? 20
5 
You live in another man’s flat, 20
6 
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You haven't even a back yard, 
So why should you murder for THAT? 
20
7 
20
9 
20
8 
21
0 
You haven't a hut or a building, 21
1 
No flower, no garden, it’s true, 21
2 
The landlords have grabbed all the country, 21
3 
Let THEM do the fighting – NOT YOU. 21
4 
21
5 
In the event, the case made by the prosecution was to connect the above- 216 
mentioned circular letter sent to the members of the forces who were 217 
subscribers to War Commentary with articles on the history of soldiers’ 218 
councils in Germany and Russia in 1917 and 1918, and on the European 219 
resistance movements which, as the Allied armies advanced in 1944, were 220 
being urged to hand over their arms to the governments then being set up 221 
under military auspices. One of the headlines in War Commentary urged 22
2 
resistance movements in Europe to “Hang onto Your Arms!”, and this was 22
3 
used by the prosecution to show that the paper was telling British soldiers 22
4 
to keep their rifles for revolutionary action. On 26 April Richards, 22
5 
Hewetson, and Sansom were found guilty and sentenced (Berneri was 22
6 
acquitted on a legal technicality that allows that a wife cannot be guilty of 22
7 
conspiracy with her husband). The judge was Norman Birkett, and the 22
8 
prosecution was conducted by the Attorney General, Sir Donald Somerville. 22
9 
A Freedom Press Defence Committee was organised to raise funds for the 23
0 
defence and this won the support of many public figures including George 23
1 
Orwell, Herbert Read, Harold Laski, Kingsley Martin, Benjamin Britten, 23
2 
Augustus John, and Bertrand Russell. 23
3 
Coming right at the end of the war, the use of emergency defence 23
4 
regulations caused public controversy, stoked by the coordinated public 23
5 
protests of these prominent individuals. A letter condemning the impending 23
6 
charge and the police raids which preceded it was published in the 23
7 
New Statesman of 3 March 1945, and included the signatures of T.S. Eliot, 23
8 
E.M. Forster, and Stephen Spender. On 31 March the New Statesman, the 23
9 
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political and cultural magazine founded in 1913 by prominent members of 24
0 
the Fabian Society, published a further letter which announced that the 24
1 
Freedom Defence Committee had been set up to organize and fund the 24
2 
defence of the anarchists. The officers of the committee included Herbert 24
3 
Read and Fenner Brockway, and the list of sponsorsincluded Aneurin Bevan, 24
4 
Gerald Brenan, Vera Brittain, Alex Comfort, Cyril Connolly, Clifford 24
5 
Curzon, Victor Gollancz, H.J. Laski, J. Middleton Murry, George Orwell, 24
6 
J.B. Priestley, Reginald Reynolds, D.S. Savage, and George Woodcock. 24
7 
The committee was also broadly concerned to guard free speech and went on 24
8 
to oppose the continuance of military and industrial conscription after the 24
9 
war. The anarchists found that their profile was raised from magazines of 25
0 
very low circulation to representation in the high-distribution daily tabloids 25
1 
in which the case was publicized. A special role in this campaign was played 25
2 
by Herbert Read, a writer and art critic who linked the more specifically 25
3 
anarchist milieus with a broader intellectual public.
17 
Read noted that 25
4 
“A certain weight of opinion has formed behind […] [the anarchists], 25
5 
particularly among members of the younger generation.”18 25
6 
It was significant to the defence that the editors were being charged under 25
7 
special wartime regulations in 1944 when it was clear that the war was 25
8 
nearing its end. This indicated to concerned intellectuals the scope of state 25
9 
ambition to regulate printed opinion after the war. In April 1945 Common 26
0 
17. See Honeywell, A British Anarchist Tradition, pp. 53–56. 
18. Herbert Read, “Before the Trial”, War Commentary, 1 April 1945, repr. in David Goodway 
(ed.), Herbert Read: A One-Man Manifesto and Other Writings for Freedom Press (London, 
1994), pp. 96–99, 97. 
Wealth printed an article on the state of political censorship in Britain which 
261 was fiercely critical of the War Commentary prosecution, which it saw as 
“a 262 test case” in the use of emergency legislation to “crush political 
opposition”, 263 and evidence that “the Government could easily stifle all 
opposition 264 together”. Also, it was noted in Common Wealth (a left-wing 
publication 265 aligned with cooperative, syndicalist, and guild socialist 
traditions), “there 266 is every sign of terror at the prospect of a political 
awakening in the 267 Services”. If the prosecution was successful, it was 
argued, “the way will be 268 clear for the Government to make further and 
wider application of its 269 powers to suppress opinion and to imprison its 
political opponents”.19 270 
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Read addressed the public protests about the prosecution with sweeping 
271 condemnations of the government, and the class oppression underpinning 
272 the trial. “Our statesmen have made a chaos and call it victory”, he 
charged, 273 “[m]illions of men are dead, and their silence is called peace”.20 
Read 274 claimed that, whilst the anarchists prosecuted were a small group, 
the 275 implications of the prosecution were of national significance, 
declaring that 276 
19. Repr. in War Commentary, 21 April 1945. 
20. Quoted from reprint in War Commentary, 21 April 1945. 
“I speak to you as an Englishman, as one proud to follow in the tradition of 277 
Milton and Shelley”. The trial of the anarchists had implications for anyone, 278 
he argued, who valued their native rights of free speech, and anyone who 279 
sought to resist the growth of “that foul and un-English institution, the 280 
political police”.21 The invocation of war regulations at such a late stage in 281 
the war was interpreted as a warning of the authoritarian shape that 282 
the postwar state would take, and Read claimed that the use of Defence 283 
Regulation 39A was being prolonged into peacetime in a covert spirit of 284 
increasing censorship.
22 
The prosecution thus turned into the kind of cause 285 
célèbre that the government had been carefully trying to avoid throughout 286 
the war by refraining from formal and direct censorship. At the same time, 287 
the case of the anarchists came to be presented as one of traditional British 288 
liberties under siege, even by the anarchists themselves. Commentators 289 
have found it curious that the authorities chose to risk this controversy at 290 
such a late stage in the war by invoking emergency regulations against a 291 
seemingly obscure group of writers. It is to this group, and the arguments 292 
that they advanced, that this discussion will now turn. 293 
ANARCHIST ANTI-MILITARISM: WAR, DISORDER, AND 294 
THE STATE 295 
The noticeable revival of interest in anarchism in Britain had been triggered 296 
in the 1930s by the Spanish Civil War, which had led to the publication in 297 
Britain of Spain and the World, a fortnightly journal produced by the 298 
anarchist Freedom Press publishing house. Part of the active core of the 299 
editorial group had its origins in the Italian anarchist movement, which had 300 
“always flourished in London”, and had, since the 1920s, developed with a 301 
vigorous anti-fascist tradition.
23 
The publication emerged in 1936, edited by 302 
Vero Recchioni (later Vernon Richards), the son of an Italian anarchist, 303 
and Marie Louise Berneri, daughter of Italian anti-fascist activist Camillo 304 
Berneri (who was assassinated in Spain the 1930s). Spain and the World 305 
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changed its name to Revolt! in the period between the war in Spain and the 306 
beginning of World War II, and Revolt! became War Commentary early in 307 
the war, reverting back to the traditional title Freedom in August 1945. 308 
War Commentary stood outside the pro-war consensus of mainstream 309 
parties and political groupings in Britain and consistently opposed the 310 
fundamental assumptions of government policy throughout the war with 311 
its virulent anti-militarist line. However, as anarchist historian of the period 312 
Albert Meltzer notes, the paper was soon “well in demand by various peace 313 
21. Read, “Before the Trial”, p. 99. 
22. Herbert Read, “After the Trial”, speech after the trial of the editors of War Commentary, in 
Freedom: Isit a Crime?, repr. in Goodway, Herbert Read: A One-Man Manifesto, pp. 100–104, 
103. 
23. Albert Meltzer, The Anarchists in London 1935–1955 (Sanday, Orkney, 1976), p. 9. 
24 
groups, coming into contact with anarchist ideas for the first time”. 314 
Historically, whilst pacifism refers to opposition to war, and to positive 315 
efforts to create peace between nations, anti-militarism identifies intra-state 
316 warfare with the political and economic interests of elites. For anarchists, 
317 anti-militarism represents an objection not just to war itself but to the 318 
underpinning political logic of top-down “chains of command” that inhere 
319 in centralized war-ready nation states. Shared concerns about conscription 
320 drew anarchists and pacifists together in World War II, and anarchist and 
321 pacifist agendas began to merge from that point onwards (this 
convergence 322 having a significant impact on later
 twentieth-century anti-nuclear 323 movements). 324 
The medical doctor John Heweston came to the editorial group of War 325 
Commentary via this pacifist connection, moving over from the Forward 326 
Group of the Peace Pledge Union. During the war he and Berneri periodi- 327 
cally worked full-time (unwaged) on the editorship of War Commentary. 328 
Artist Philip Sansom was drawn to the Freedom Press editorial group in 
1943 329 following the publication of Herbert Read’s Education through Art. 
He 330 edited and wrote a great deal of the political analysis and commentary 
found 331 in Freedom in the postwar years. Sansom was part of the beginning 
of the 332 campaign against capital punishment and led the occupation of the 
Cuban 333 Embassy in July 1963 to protest against Castro’s treatment of 
Cuban 334 anarchists. He also found an active role in most of the postwar 
protest 335 movements, including CND and anti-apartheid activities. 336 
Within the wider literature in the field of anarchist studies this anti- 337 
militarist current within anarchism is recognized as one of the most 338 
important links between the anarchism of the 1930s and the renewal of 339 
interest in anarchism in the late 1950s and early 1960s, particularly as 340 
expressed in relation to technologies of war such as aerial bombing and 341 
nuclear weapons.
25 
The editors of War Commentary raised objections to 342 
the policies of the wartime establishment from the outset, consistent with 343 
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anarchist anti-militarist accounts of the social relationships underpinning 344 
the state’s propensity to engage in warfare. According to this anti-militarist 
345 analysis, militarism tends to transcend strictly military purposes to define 
346 social and political relationships, imposing military values upon civilian 
life 347 even in peacetime. Militarism is thus understood as an embedded 
hier- 348 archical political logic of uniformity and “chains of command” 
derived 349 from military sources, as opposed to a heterogeneous 
participatory logic of 350 shared decision making. It represents the esteeming 
of centralized political 351 power as well as the belief in the importance of 
war and the glorification of 352 
24. Ibid., p. 19. 
25. Carissa Honeywell, “Bridging the Gaps: Twentieth-Century Anglo-American Anarchist 
Thought”, in Ruth Kinna (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Anarchism (London, 2012), pp. 
111–139, 128. See also Honeywell, A British Anarchist Tradition, pp. 20–22. 
violence. According to anarchists, these vertical chains of command feed the 353 
logic of blindly obeying orders, whilst horizontal and egalitarian social 354 
structures foster empathy, humanity, and responsibility for actions and 355 
outcomes. This anti-militarism thus blurs the distinction between the 356 
politics of warfare and the dynamics of social relations: Hierarchical power 357 
both in wartime and during peace is considered to be destructive of social 358 
cohesion and erodes the resources to resolve human conflict. 359 
“War is the health of the State” argued American sociologist Randolph 360 
Bourne, and following his analysis, the anarchists understood war to be 361 
desirable for the state, bolstering the full culmination of collective identifi- 362 
cation and “hierarchy of values” upon which it depended.26 As far as the 363 
anarchists were concerned, the political mobilization of individuals and 364 
communities as a collective national entity reinforced the core pernicious 365 
features of the nation-state as they saw them. These features were its 366 
sovereign territoriality, with the maintenance of territorial borders, the 367 
exclusive jurisdiction over people and property within that territory, the 368 
monopoly over the means of force, the system of law which overrides all 369 
other codes and customs, outside of which no rights or obligation are seen 370 
to exist, and the idea of the nation as the principle political community.
27
 371 
The wholesale militarization of that political community was implied, they 372 
argued, as soon as the state came to be seen as based on the nation and 373 
subjects were transformed into citizens. As Geoffrey Ostergaard remarks in 374 
this respect, highlighting the historical link between the nation-statehood 375 
and militarism: “Bayonets were thrust into the hands of citizens often 376 
before they were given the ballot.”28 Globally, as the support of worker- 377 
citizens became more crucial for the successful prosecution of industrialized 378 
wars, nationalism and patriotism formed a basis for mobilizing soldiers and 379 
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citizens.
29
 380 
The anarchists around War Commentary iterated their anti-militarist 381 
arguments in relation to World War II, claiming that, “[g]overnments need 382 
wars to survive and without them they would collapse”.30 In the pages of 383 
War Commentary the war was a symptom of the state in its most recent and 384 
dangerous implications.
31 
Colin Ward, a witness during the trial, and later a 385 
26. Randolph S. Bourne, “The State” (1919), in idem, War and the Intellectual: Essays, 1915–1919 
(New York, 1964), pp. 71–72; see Colin Ward, quoting Bourne, “The State”, in “The Awkward 
Question”, Freedom, 17 August 1957. 
27. Geoffrey Ostergaard, “Resisting the Nation-State: The Pacifist and Anarchist Traditions”, in 
Leonard Tivey (ed.), The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics (Oxford, 1981), pp. 
171–196, 172. 
28. Ibid., p. 177. 
29. Silver, Forces of Labour, p. 137. 
30. Derrick A. Pike, “Conscientious Objectors in World War Two”, in The Raven: Anarchist 
Quarterly, 29, 8:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 48–49. 
31. Reg Reynolds, War Commentary, June 1941. 
prolific anarchist author, expressed this sentiment clearly: “War is the 386 
expression of the State in its most perfect form: it is its finest hour.”32 387 
Resistance to the war-making powers of the state was a dominant theme in 
388 the anarchist commentary and intellectual output of the late 1930s and 389 
1940s. According to a 1941 edition of War Commentary, anarchists must 390 
“concentrate all their energies” against war “in fighting against the State”.33 
391 
The Freedom Press writers urged disobedience even before the war started: 
392 “Refuse to serve ‘your’ country!”, and “Refuse to assist the state in its 393 
manoeuvres for murder!”.34 In order to resist the war, they claimed, it was 394 
necessary to resist the militaristic policies of national service and 
conscription 395 regardless of “the fall of France”, “Dunkirk”, or the 
“Stalinist switchover”.35 396 
In 1938 and 1939, when signs of war seemed already evident, the 397 
Freedom Press turned against official claims to be waging war in the name 
398 of democracy or international justice, repeatedly referring to the Spanish 
399 experience. Looking at British policy towards the Spanish republic in the 
400 1930s, they argued, “we discover that the policy of the present 
government 401 has in every respect been one of active support for fascism”, 
and further 402 “not once was it suggested that we should go to defend 
Spanish democ- 403 racy”.36 Equating fascism with centralised, militarized, 
authoritarian state 404 government, the anarchists argued that it was “just as 
rampant here as 405 abroad”.37 Alongside War Commentary, anarchist writer 
Alex Comfort 406 argued that fascism was a characteristic of militarized 
German and British 407 states alike, which are “sitting on the Press ‘because 
this is Total War’”, 408 and “making our soldiers jab blood bladders while 
loudspeakers howl 409 propaganda at them”.38 410 
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Anarchist polemic like this meant that War Commentary writers 411 were 
highly sensitive to the “mechanised, highly organised, technical” 412 
characteristics of British state policy, under which ordinary soldiers were 413 
drafted.
39 “Being obstinate people”, they argued in War Commentary 414 in 
1942 “we refuse to believe that there is the slightest trace of human 415 
emancipation in the fact of working at maximum output, consuming 416 as 
little as possible and leaving the daily lives of millions of people in the 417 
hands of a state power over which they have no control whatever”.40 418 
Anarchist anti-militarism in the 1940s was particularly hostile towards the 
419 
32. Colin Ward, Anarchy in Action (London, 1982), p. 25. 
33. War Commentary, July 1941. 
34. Revolt!, 23 March 1939. 
35. War Commentary, 4:13 (May 1943). 
36. Editorial, Spain and the World, 16 September 1938. 
37. Revolt!, 23 March 1939. 
38. Alex Comfort, in George Orwell, D.S. Savage, George Woodcock, and Alex Comfort,“Pacifism 
and the War: A Controversy”, Partisan Review, September–October 1942, p. 417. 
39. Charles Ridel (Louis Mercier Vega), War Commentary, mid-January 1942. 
40. Ibid. 
policy of conscription, as a “tremendous weapon in the hands of reaction”, 420 
and under capitalism, “simply a reversion to chattel slavery”.41 421 
The anti-militarism of the Freedom Press anarchists was a clearly iden- 422 
tifiable feature of their publications, campaigns, and public meetings 423 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Police Special Branch highlighted 424 
“opposition to militarism” and “opposition to the war” as the group’s main 425 
political orientations. A Special Branch report dated November 1941 426 
underlined that the sentiments expressed at this event were that “Churchill 427 
is as much a brigand as Hitler”.42 In a detailed report of one London 428 
meeting on the 7 July 1942, Special Branch noted that 400 people attended, 429 
including servicemen and 3 American soldiers. The police report noted 430 
“loud applause” when one speaker said he considered that there was no 431 
enthusiasm for the war, especially in the services, and another speaker drew 432 
attention to the “thousands of deserters”.43 In January 1944, Special Branch 433 
reported that “[t]he contents of War Commentary are extremely anti-war, 434 
and condemn British bombing”.44 435 
As well as condemning conscription and allied bombing strategies, the 436 
anarchists paid particular attention to the wartime experiences of serving 437 
personnel, the “workers in arms”. In the spring of 1944 this focus parti- 438 
cularly concerned the prospect of demobilization. In May 1944, an article 439 
entitled “Mutiny in the British Army” appeared in War Commentary 440 
which argued that “[p]resent discussion of post war demobilization should 441 
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naturally recall the discussion of the subject in 1918”,45 when “[t]he 442 
soldiers’ movement proved to be one of the most successful strikes ever 443 
attempted”. A subsequent edition of War Commentary concerned the 444 
“British Mutinies in France”, claiming that “[e]verywhere such organisations 445 
were victorious. Briefly, the fruits of victory were: 1. Rapid demobilization of 446 
millions of soldiers 2. Pay was doubled 3. Food, shelter and other conditions 447 
were improved 4. Stupid parades and discipline were relaxed.”46 The July 448 
1944 feature, “How Wars End” argued that revolutionary and mutinous 449 
sentiments accompany the ending of wars, and more so with those that have 450 
engaged a civilian army.
47
 451 
In August 1944 the paper ran an advertisement for special subscription 452 
rates for soldiers. These features accompanied articles attacking proposed 453 
41. Reynolds, War Commentary, June 1941. 
42. The National Archives [hereafter TNA], HO45/25553 833412/8, Extract from Special 
BranchFortnightly Summary No.25, 15 November 1941. 
43. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/8, Extract from Special Branch Fortnightly Summary No.41,15 July 
1942. 
44. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/8, Extract from Special Branch Fortnightly Summary No.77,15 
January 1944. 
45. “Mutiny in the British Army”, War Commentary, 5:13 (May 1944). 
46. “British Mutinies in France”, War Commentary, 5:14 (May 1944). 
47. “How Wars End”, War Commentary, 5:17 (July 1944). 
social insurance schemes, and expressing doubts about postwar conditions, 
454 especially regarding employment, housing, health, and civil liberties.
48 
In 
455 November 1944 the paper adopted a large format newspaper style, a more 
456 accessible and immediate form which the anarchists claimed was 
necessary 457 in order to report effectively on the fast pace of events in the 
months 458 approaching the end of the war. The Freedom Press writers, well 
versed in 459 anarchist anti-militarist socio-political analysis, had clear ideas 
about the 460 opportunities presented by the imminent end of the war and 
strong doubts 461 about the postwar settlement that was being shaped. 462 
 THE BRITISH WARFARE STATE 463 
For many historical commentators the prosecution and trial of the Freedom 
464 Press group has seemed incongruous. The events, however, appear in a 
465 different light when the dominant view of a clear disjunction between and 
a 466 smooth and conclusive transition from the wartime to the postwar 
period is 467 challenged. Writing from the revisionist approach to traditional 
historio- 468 graphies of the war, David Edgerton argues that established 
histories of 469 Britain between 1920 and 1970 neglect to show the 
dominance of military 470 logic in the policymaking of the period, 
overlooking the significance of 471 active “readiness for international war” in 
the social and economic activities 472 of the British state, even during the 
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war.
49 
This oversight obscures the 473 continuities of a British warfare state 
but also dissonant social experiences of 474 military policy in 1940s Britain, 
notably conscription and demobilization. 475 
According to Edgerton, the failure or refusal to recognize the British 476 
warfare state is “longstanding”, “systematic”, and “deeply entrenched” in 477 
political commentary and historical writing, and he argues that “by contrast 
478 the welfare state loomed large”.50 Edgerton focuses on the development, 
479 acceleration, and entrenchment of military industries, technologies, and 
480 infrastructure in the mid- and later twentieth century period. Edgerton 481 
contrasts his image of a “British military-industrial complex” with the 482 
dominant “welfare-state” image found in the majority of economic his- 483 
tories, social histories, labour histories, and cultural histories: “the welfare 
484 state has come to define the British state as a whole even for the most 485 
ideologically discerning of historians”. As he notes, “[i]n these histories the 
486 warfare state does not appear to exist, even in wartime”.51 487 
48. War Commentary, 5:19 (August 1944). 
49. Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 1. 
50. Ibid., pp. 13, 287, 292. 
51. Ibid., pp. 4, 290, 292. A forceful consideration of the interrelations between war, welfare, 
capital accumulation, and the position of labour during twentieth-century global history, can be 
found in Silver, Forces of Labour, pp. 132–141. 
Edgerton argues that the exclusively “welfarist” image of the twentieth- 488 
century British state explains the “jarring effect that contemporary dissident 489 
views still have today”.52 His revisions to the exclusively “welfarist” image 490 
of the British state in the twentieth century are connected to the challenges 491 
posed by Angus Calder, Paul Addison, Rex Pope, and Alan Allport to the 492 
political mythologies associated with World War II. In their attempts to 493 
revise these historiographical orthodoxies, Edgerton and other historians 494 
point to the gap in British social history regarding the experience of mili- 495 
tarized civilians. “Much has been written about civilian life in wartime”, 496 
notes Addison, “but the social history of the armed forces has yet to be 497 
written in depth”.53 As Allport notes, this also means that “the demobilisa- 498 
tion experience of 1945 and all the powerful hopes and fears that it generated 499 
has curiously vanished from our collective memory”.54 500 
An important omission in the strangely de-militarized account of 501 
mid-century Britain is the genuine fear of mass unrest that surrounded the 502 
demobilization of conscripted personnel. Allport writes that there were real 503 
concerns that “soldierly anger would be too volatile for parliamentary 504 
democracy, and that ex-servicemen would take literally the call for organised 505 
resistance in the form of political extremism”.55 Novelist and journalist J.L. 506 
Hodson made a similar observation in his 1945 war diary The Sea and the 507 
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Land: “They’ve had a bellyful of being ordered about, and are not going to 508 
put up with it when the fighting is finished.”56 These conscripted civilians, 509 
according to the Daily Mirror correspondent with the British army in 510 
Germany, had become a “League of Angry Men”. On returning from 511 
Germany he wrote: “I came home with the feeling that the serviceman needs 512 
his own resistance movement if he is to get justice.”57 513 
Historiographical orthodoxy has obscured the telling of dissonant 514 
accounts of militarism like these and the fears they generated within 515 
government, and this means that both the anarchist engagement with mili- 516 
tarized civilians and the government response to it have appeared peculiar 517 
and incongruous. The work of revisionist historians, especially Edgerton’s 518 
contribution to this debate, provides an important corrective to these 519 
oversights and omissions, enabling a fuller and more satisfying account of 520 
the prosecution of the Freedom Press anarchists. 521 
52. Edgerton, Warfare State, pp. 4, 290, 292. 
53. Paul Addison, Now the War is Over (London, 1995), p. 4. 
54. Alan Allport, Demobbed: Coming Home after the Second World War (New Haven, CT [etc.], 
2009), pp. 7–8. 
55. Ibid., p. 6. 
56. J.L. Hodson, The Sea and the Land: Being Some Account of Journeys, Meetings, and What 
Was Said to Me in Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Holland between March 1943 and May 
1945 (London, 1945), p. 280. 
57. Eric Dornan Smith, “The League of Angry Men”, Daily Mirror, 4 June 1945, p. 1, quoted in 
Allport, Demobbed, p. 6. 
 WARCOMMENTARY AND THE HOME OFFICE 522 
 “[…] it can perhaps be safely ignored”. 524523 
525 
Ewing and Gearty emphasize “the degree to which emergency rather than 
526 ordinary law was the normal state of affairs” between 1914–1945.58 As 
they 527 and other authors argue, emergency powers, as a means of legally 
restricting 528 liberties, were used during this period to temper political 
democratization. 529 This includes the attempt to dilute the impact of full 
adult suffrage on the 530 established hereditary hierarchies associated with 
the old order, which had 531 perceived the “triple shock” of World War I, the 
Irish secession, and the 532 Russian Revolution as evidence of what it might 
expect from the democratic 533 transformation of society. However, despite 
the fact that “the government 534 were involved in a process designed to 
stifle forms of political opposition 535 more or less continuously throughout 
the war”, both the Chamberlain and 536 the Churchill governments were 
careful to employ informal tactics rather 537 than public policy methods to 
control and censor dissident political orga- 538 nization, precisely in order to 
“maintain a democratic image”, and avoid 539 publicizing undesirable views 
and organizations.
59 
540 
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In a Cabinet memo concerning anti-war propaganda it was argued that if 
541 prosecutions were brought against anti-war groups those groups might 542 
attract more sympathy than they would otherwise have done.
60 
Sir John 543 
Anderson, the Home Secretary (minister of the interior), explicitly stated, 544 
regarding the use of the law in this context, that “it was contrary to our 545 
traditions to use this method against a purely political organisation”.61 546 
Instead, it was recommended that a policy of covert action and normal law 
547 was employed to control anti-war and anti-government propaganda, such 
548 as the use of section 5 of the Public Order Act, regarding behaviour likely 
to 549 cause a breach of the peace.
62 
The Public Order Act was indeed used as 
a 550 political weapon to suppress, for instance, the Communist Party leaflet 
551 “The People Must Act”, and the communist Daily Worker, following 552 
instructions by the War Cabinet to chief constables.
63 
553 
War Commentary was published throughout most of the war, without 554 
attracting overt censorship. This was despite some strong opinions within 555 
government ministries that it ought to be censored, expressed for example 
556 by George Thomson of the Ministry of Information in a letter to George 
557 
Griffith of the Ministry of Home Security in relation to the anarchist attacks 
558 
58. Keith D. Ewing and Conor A. Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and 
The Rule of Law in Britain, 1914–1945 (Oxford, 2000), p. 415. 
59. Stammers, Civil Liberties in Britain, p. 123. 
60. TNA, Public Record Office [hereafter, PRO] CAB 67/1, WP (G) (39) 36. 
61. TNA, PRO CAB 73/2, CDC (40) 8th Meeting, 6 March 1940. 
62. TNA, PRO MEPOL 2/6260, confidential memo from the Commissioner, 14 May 1940. 
63. TNA, HO 158/32, Circular to Chief Constables, No. 832463/105. 
on the allied bombing campaigns: “it does seem to me extraordinary that 559 
this sort of disgusting material is allowed to be published in this country”.64 560 
This careful approach to their publication was recognized by the anarchists. 561 
In a letter included with the dispatch of Freedom Press publications by post 562 
in 1942 (and which was intercepted by the authorities), Hewetson wrote: 563 
“[the] Home Secretary does not think ours and a number of other periodicals 564 
of sufficient influence to justify any drastic action on his part, more so as he is 565 
so unpopular, and presumably does not want to be even more so”.65 566 
The reluctance to prosecute the anarchists until 1944 is indeed a marked 567 
feature of the Home Office files on the matter and of its responses to 568 
pressure from other ministries, institutions, and individuals to pursue a 569 
prosecution. Although it was noted by Special Branch that War Commen- 570 
tary was overtly “obstructionist in its attitude to the present war effort”,66 571 
senior staff at the Home Office took the position that “poisonous as it is, it 572 
can perhaps be safely ignored”.67 Notes on the Home Office files for this 573 
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period regard the publication as “rather academic” and “confined mainly to 574 
pacifists”.68 The prevailing opinion seems to have been that whilst “[t]his 575 
group has a violently revolutionary programme”, “it is too detached from 576 
real life to cause much trouble”.69 Likewise, in response to concerns from 577 
employers’ organizations concerning War Commentary’s celebration of 578 
railway strikes in 1943, the Home Secretary replied that: “[t]his publication 579 
is in fact known to the Department, but no action against it under the 580 
Defence Regulations has as yet seemed called for”.70 581 
On 3 May 1943 the attention of Home Office staff was drawn by the 582 
Ministry of Information to an article in War Commentary entitled 583 
“Democracy in the Army”, which focused on class inequalities in the 584 
military and “the abuse of power by officers”.71 The Scrutiny Censor was 585 
reassured by the Home Office that that they saw the paper “from time to 586 
time”.72 Even Special Branch reports of a Huddersfield meeting in which 587 
64. TNA, HO45/25553 83342/3, letter from George Thomson, Ministry of Information, toGeorge 
Griffith, Ministry of Home Security, 11 September 1943. 
65. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/5, Ministry of Information, Postal Censorship from FreedomPress 
N.W.6 to Dr. A.L. Goldwater, New York, 3 January 1942. 
66. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/3, Metropolitan Police Special Branch report on War Commentary, 
25 April 1941. 
67. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/1 circulated note initialled M.S.W. 3 July 1942. 
68. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/3, Home Office circulation notes, initialled M.S.W., 3 July 1942. 
69. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/8, Home Office circulation notes, initialled T.H.M., 25 October 
1941. 
70. TNA, HO45/25553 83342/3 letter from W. Goody, Secretary Carlisle Railwaymen’s Joint 
Committee, to Herbert Morrison, 23 April, 1943. For the original letter of concern see TNA, 
HO45/25553 83342/3, letter from J.J. Nunn to W. Goody, 1 May 1943. 
71. War Commentary, 4:8 (Mid February 1943). 
72. TNA, HO45/25553 83342/3, note attached to copy of War Commentary, 4:8 (Mid February 
1943), initialled G.G., 3 March 1943. 
anarchist Tom Brown apparently told the audience that “they were all 588 
capable of doing sabotage”73 did not sway official opinion that “[i]t is often 
589 undesirable to prosecute a propagandist for expressions of opinion which 
590 may technically offend the law, as it only gives him the advertisement 591 
he desires”.74 In April 1944, the Home Office position towards War 592 
Commentary was still consistent with its earlier view: 593 
[...] it would appear undesirable to take any steps against it for the following 594 
reasons: 1) It would afford publicity for an obscure publication which by reason of 595 
its small circulationisunlikelyto have muchinfluence.2)Any attempt to suppressit 596 
could be represented as an attack on a) democratic liberties b) the working classes.75 
597 
598 
In response to an article in War Commentary that caused particular con- 
599 cern at the Ministry of Labour and National Service in May 1944 entitled 
600 “Bevin Declares War on Miners”, the Home Office again argued against 
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601 proceedings on the grounds that they “would provide an opportunity for 
the 602 Anarchists to try to justify their statements in Court and to repeat their 
603 misrepresentations with a chance of reaching a very much wider public 
604 than they otherwise reach”.76 In light of this argument, Home Office staff 
605 regarded action against War Commentary under the Defence Regulations 
as 606 “wholly out of the question” almost throughout the war.77 608607 
609 
 “[…] storm clouds are gathering” 610 
Whereas taking further action against War Commentary was not an agreed 
611 option among the wartime governmental institutions until late 1944, the 
612 group’s activities started to attract increasing attention from various 613 
departments from end of 1943. It was in relation to contact with serving 614 
troops towards the end of World War II that more serious Home Office 615 
interest was aroused in the activities of the Freedom Press. 616 
On 29 October 1943, the Postal and Telegraph Censor, working within 617 
the Ministry of Information, intercepted a multigraphed circular letter to 618 
“Friends of the Freedom Press”. In the circulation notes assessing the 619 
intercepted material, which were attached to the Home Office file, the 620 
authorities noted that: “it appears that special efforts are being made to keep 
621 in contact with members of the ‘Friends of the Freedom Press’ who are 622 
serving in the armed forces”.78 The letter in question was explicitly directed 
623 
73. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/9, Extract from regional summary (Special Branch securitywork) 
for region no.2 for fortnight ended 31 January 1942. 
74. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/9, Home Office notes for circulation, signed J.M. Ross,13 February 
1942. 
75. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/13, Home Office circulation notes, 28 April 1944. 
76. TNA, HO45 833412/20, letter from J.J. Nunn, Home Office, to Mr Emmerson, Ministry 
ofLabour and National Service, 19 May 1944. 
77. TNA, HO45 833412/20, file circulation minutes, initialled J.A.N., 15 May 1944. 
78. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/5, Postal and Telegraph Censorship, 12 October 1943. 
to members of the forces sympathetic to the Freedom Press and pointed to 624 
“a more alert critical mood”, and even “justified aggressive cynicism” 625 
among “workers in uniform”. It went on to state that “the spirit of liberty of 626 
men and women in uniform is developing”. The Freedom Press anarchists 627 
claimed that “[d]iscontent grows with the increase of hardships and will 628 
grow with the coming intensive suffering of the next phase of war”.79 629 
Home Office circulation notes testify to increasing government aware- 630 
ness of Freedom Press activities: “In view of the fact that Friends of 631 
Freedom Press think that they are gaining increasing support in the forces, 632 
it may be worth watching to see what line War Commentary follows.”80 633 
From February 1944 to January 1945 the Home Office regularly scruti- 634 
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nized War Commentary. Particular attention was paid to criticisms of 635 
military policy, industrial strikes, and material relating to discontent and 636 
radicalism among serving troops. In February 1944 for example, Home 637 
Office notes record: “This number contains a mischievous leading article on 638 
the folly of bombing.”81 In May 1944 staff at the Home Office noted that 639 
War Commentary “describes mutinies in the British Army in 1919”, which, 640 
in the anarchists’ view, “are recalled by the present discussions about 641 
demobilisation”.82 These articles, alongside the circular letter, were seen at 642 
the Home Office as “indicative of the interest which the anarchist move- 643 
ment is taking in the Forces”.83 Related to this, in July 1944, “[e]xcerpts 644 
from soldiers’ letters commenting on alleged unrest in the forces” are 645 
observed, as well as “an article on mutinies which points out that mutinies 646 
cannot be organised but arise from minor discontents continued over a 647 
period, plus frustration and disillusion”. “One gathers”, commented Home 648 
Office staff, “that the mutinies which will occur at the end of this war will 649 
have a better chance of success that their predecessors”.84 650 
In August 1944, Home Office notes record that “An article signed ‘from 651 
the ranks’ purports to show that the British army is ripe for revolution and 652 
says that the officers are the counter revolutionaries.” In September, Home 653 
Office staff commented with concern on a War Commentary review of a 654 
book on the revolts in the German Navy in 1918 and quoted from the 655 
review itself: “such knowledge we must all have for the coming stormy days 656 
that are ahead. For all who are weather-wise can see that the storm clouds 657 
are gathering”. However, it was also noted that “War Commentary does not 658 
dare to print hints on how to mutiny, so it projects them into the past, 659 
79. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/5, Letter from publishers of War Commentary, 12 October 1943. 
80. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/5, Home Office circulation notes, initialled S.C.S.R, 2 
November 1943. 
81. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/15, circulation notes, 11 March 1944. 
82. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/15, 7 July 1944. 
83. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/21, J.M.P., minutes, 24 May 1944. 
84. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/15, 7 July 1944. 
cf. articles on mutinies in France after the armistice in 1918 in previous 660 
numbers.”85 It was in conjunction with further Freedom Press attempts to 661 
communicate with the forces that the anti-war material precipitated con- 662 
cerns at MI5, the agency for domestic intelligence. 663 
Early in November 1944, it became known to the police that a further 664 
circular letter, dated 25 October 1944, had been distributed by the Freedom 
665 Press to its members serving in the forces. Reference was made to this in 
the 666 
October 1944 number of War Commentary which called attention to the 667 
“Soldiers’ Page” quoting letters from serving men who had visited political 
668 meetings. “It is apparent from the circular letter”, notes the police report 
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669 written by Chief Inspector Whitehead, “that War Commentary is widely 
670 circulated among members of the Forces”. The report draws attention to 
671 key passages in the Freedom Press’s October letter which urged readers 
to 672 circulate their copies of War Commentary among their units and pass 
names 673 and addresses of potential sympathizers to the Freedom Press. The 
report 674 quotes the letter in detail on the subject of discussion groups in the 
military 675 and their potential to become embryonic “Soldiers’ Councils”. 
“In view of 676 the seemingly dangerous material from a security angle, 
contained in this 677 circular letter”, wrote Whitehead, “a special watch was 
kept on the sub- 678 sequent editions of ‘War Commentary’”.86 679 
Particular issues of War Commentary were highlighted for special 680 
attention by Whitehead. This included an issue from the beginning of 681 
November 1944, notably the feature “All Power to the Soviets”, which 682 
concerned revolutionary action. He noted in particular those articles in 683 
War Commentary which provided historical surveys of postwar insurrec- 684 
tionary activities in Germany, France, and Russia, entitled “Spontaneous 685 
Insurrections”, “Soldiers’ Councils during the French Revolution”, and 686 
“Councils as Instruments of Politics”. Whitehead’s extensive quotes from 687 
War Commentary in his report include the following, which featured in the 
688 paper under a sub-heading referring to the “Lessons of 1917”: 689 
[...] the decline of Army discipline was a sort of natural process, long before the 690 
revolutionary left began to take a hand. Wholesale desertions, complete disregard 691 
of orders, attacks upon and even murders of unpopular officers, fraternization 692 with 
the German troops, blank refusal to go into attack; these were spontaneous 693 
manifestations of revolutionary feeling.87 694 
695 
Whitehead also drew attention to the War Commentary issue dated 696 
11 November 1944 which leads with the article “People in Arms”, and 697 
85. TNA, HO45/25553 833412/15, J.M.P., 6 October 1944. 
86. TNA, HO45 25554 8333412/27, Police Report of 1 January 1945, including discussion of 
thecircular letter and searches carried out on 14 December 1944, written by Chief Inspector 
Whitehead. 
87. “Lessons of 1917”, War Commentary, 6:1 (1 November 1944). 
refers to the situation in France when armed bands of maquis seized control 698 
in the provinces. In this article, under the sub-heading “Similar Conditions 699 
Elsewhere”, which addresses the relationship between allied liberation 700 
forces and popular movements in Greece and Belgium, the anarchists 701 
expressed a sentiment which was to be highly significant for the prosecution 702 
of the Freedom Press editors. Whitehead drew particular attention to the 703 
anarchist assertion of, in their words, “the revolutionary potentialities 704 
inherent in the closing period of the war”, and in particular the assertion in 705 
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War Commentary that “[i]t is the duty of Anarchists to urge the workers 706 
everywhere, as Connolly did the Irish workers of the Citizen Army to ‘hold 707 
onto your arms’”.88 As Whitehead noted, the sentiment was reiterated in the 708 
subsequent issue of War Commentary, dated 25 November 1944, in an 709 
article entitled “The Workers’ Struggle in Belgium”: “We are emphatically 710 
on the other side, that of the armed workers. And we repeat again what we 711 
said in our last issue – ‘Hold on to your rifles!’”.89 The same issue included 712 
further discussion of the 1917 Wilhelmshaven mutiny in the German Navy 713 
and the 1918 Kiel Naval Mutiny. Whitehead concludes with the conviction 714 
that: “the reading by Service men, of the circular letter dated 25.10.44, taken 715 
in conjunction with the articles appearing in the War commentary dated 716 
1.11.44 and 25.11.44, would amount to ‘An incitement to mutiny’”.90 717 
In line with Whitehead’s conclusion, in November 1944, MI5 also raised 718 
concerns about the content of War Commentary and forwarded what it 719 
considered to be mutinous material to the Service Departments. In a letter 720 
concerning this material written by G.R. Mitchell, on behalf of MI5, to J.J. 721 
Nunn at the Home Office, Mitchell stated “We [MI5] feel it our duty to 722 
bring the articles in War Commentary which appear to have as their main or 723 
sole purpose the presentation of mutiny in a favourable light, to the notice 724 
of the Service Departments.”91 This material, in conjunction with the 725 
changed layout of the publication to a more accessible newspaper style, and 726 
particularly in relation to the letters circulated in the forces, convinced 727 
Home Office staff that the anarchist publication was pursuing “what might 728 
be described as a forward policy”.92 “There is a prima facie”, noted staff at 729 
the Home Office, 730 
[...] that copies of the circular issues by the Freedom Press on the 25th Oct have 731 
been distributed to serving soldiers and there is reasonable cause to suspect that 732 
88. “People in Arms”, War Commentary, 6:2 (11 November 1944), emphasis in original. 
89. War Commentary, 6:3 (25 November 1944), emphasis in original. 
90. TNA, HO45 25554 8333412/27, Police Report of 1 January 1945, including discussion of 
thecircular letter and searches carried out on 14 December 1944, written by Chief Inspector 
Whitehead. 
91. TNA, HO45 833412/20, letter from G.R. Mitchell to J.J. Nunn, Home Office, 1 November1944. 
92. TNA, HO45 25554 833412/27, J.M.P., 11 December 1944. 
the object of such distribution is not to enlighten H.M.’s forces on the causes of 733 
past mutinies and revolutions but to encourage them to prepare themselves to take 734 
similar action when the right moment comes.93 735 
736 
Thus, the activities of Freedom Press were considered to be ‘a more direct 
737 incitement to mutiny’. 738 
It was decided, in light of this “forward policy” to “nip these people’s 739 
activities in the bud before the end of the war with Germany”. “Other- 740 
wise”, argued Home Office staff in the following significant observation, 741 
 24 Carissa Honeywell 
“they might have a dangerous influence after the armistice when men in the 
742 forces were weary of military life and were perhaps not particularly eager 
to 743 police Germany, or to fight in more distant theatres of war, and had 
more 744 time at their disposal for reading and discussion”.94 This comment 
neatly 745 encapsulates the anxieties underpinning the decision to prosecute 
the 746 anarchists so late in the war. The decision was made in light of 
anticipated 747 tensions concerning the demobilization of conscripted civilian 
personnel at 748 the end of the war, and not in response to concerns about the 
successful 749 prosecution of the war itself. This reflects well-entrenched 
fears concerning 750 the possibility of postwar dissention and mutiny. 
Prosecution became 751 desirable because of official concerns about the 
social tensions likely to be 752 precipitated by large-scale demobilization. In 
the eyes of the government, 753 the police, and MI5 the concern was the 
following – with the second part of 754 the sentence revealing the degree to 
which the authorities were fearing 755 unrest during the impending period of 
demobilization: “if no action is taken 756 now it will be more difficult to take 
action later on when the position may 757 have seriously deteriorated”.95
 
758 
“SPECTRES OF MUTINY” AND THE “FORWARD POLICY” 759 
 OF THE FREEDOM PRESS 760 
“Welfarist” accounts of World War II focus exclusively on the non-serving 
761 civilian social experience. As a result, the impact of military life on a 
con- 762 scripted population that nonetheless saw itself as predominantly 
civilian 763 remains largely unwritten. A focus on the social history of 
conscripted 764 armed forces, particularly in relation to the ending of wars, 
most notably 765 demobilization, provides a key context for understanding 
the perceived 766 threat posed by the War Commentary anarchists, and the 
changed reaction 767 to it which came from government ministries and 
security services at the 768 end of the war. Indeed, the Home Office files on 
the matter make it clear 769 that it was the particular “forward policy” of the 
Freedom Press regarding 770 
93. TNA, HO45 25554 833412/27, J.A.N., 11 December 1944. 
94. TNA, HO45 25554 833412/27, J.M.P., 11 December 1944. 
95. TNA, HO45 25554 833412/27, J.A.N., 11 December 1944. 
access to the armed services that made the critical difference and finally 771 
broke the government resolve not to impede overtly the activities of the 772 
anarchists. “There is no more promising material for revolution”, writes 773 
David Lamb, “than soldiers returning from wars, careless to danger and 774 
accustomed to risks and to taking collective action”.96 Yet, as noted by 775 
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Rex Pope in the mid-1990s, “relatively little” has been written about the 776 
planning of demobilization and the resettlement of military personnel after 777 
World War II. He argues that these plans deserve closer attention because 778 
the arrangements that were made reflect policies which were “the product 779 
of the moment”, and as such reflect wartime and immediate postwar atti- 780 
tudes more directly than longer-term policy objectives relating to education 781 
or health.
97
 782 
In wider historical context, Stephen Graubard has commented that con- 783 
scription, “the conscriptive method”, addressed the manpower problem 784 
associated with modern warfare, creating, at the same time, challenges of its 785 
own.
98 
The tendency for citizen conscript armies to engage in mass social 786 
unrest after wars had been a noted feature of European warfare already in 787 
the age of revolution, yet by the end of the nineteenth century, states were 788 
increasingly dependent on the cooperation of their worker-citizens for 789 
successful imperial expansion and war, and workers on the front and behind 790 
the lines became “critical cogs” in the war machine.99 The destructiveness 791 
of modern warfare, however, had an even greater incendiary effect on 792 
worker-soldiers, even in the face of extended democratic rights. At best, as 793 
Graubard notes, a conscript soldier will accept military rule for a temporary 794 
period to secure a specific objective, but after that “his first thought is to his 795 
immediate release”.100 In line with this argument Allport reports that, after 796 
World War II, “[w]artime servicemen were generally emphatic that they 797 
were short-term citizen-soldiers rather than regulars – not ‘faceless khaki 798 
pieces of a great game of Ludo’, as the novelist Anthony Burgess put it, but 799 
‘civilians in temporary fancy dress’ whose time was now served”.101 800 
Following both world wars, demobilization was “a delicate and poten- 801 
tially explosive affair”.102 In the case of World War I, as early as 1916, 802 
96. Dave Lamb, Mutinies: 1917–1920 (Oxford [etc.], 1978), p. 9. 
97. Rex Pope, “British Demobilization after the Second World War”, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 30 (1995), pp. 65–81, 66. 
98. Graubard, “Demobilization in Great Britain following the First World War”, p. 297. 
99. As William McNeill has pointed out, “the fierce energy of the French conscripts in 1793–95, 
and the nationalist fervor of some German citizen soldiers in 1813–14, could challenge 
constituted authority as readily as it could confirm and strengthen it”; idem, The Pursuit of 
Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, IL, 1982), p. 221, 
quoted in Silver, Forces of Labour, p. 137. 
100. Graubard, “Demobilization in Great Britain Following the First World War”, p. 297. 101. 
Allport, Demobbed, p. 4. 
102. Addison, Now the War is Over, p. 19. 
strikes, desertions, and revolts were rife, and by the time of the Russian 803 
Revolution in 1917 anti-war feeling among the populations of Europe was 
804 widespread. In turn, the elites of Europe experienced a pervasive sense of 
805 fear of revolution According to Lamb, in Britain the possibility of 
internal 806 revolution became a distinctly pressing anxiety: “[t]hat winter of 
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1918–1919 807 was the nearest Britain ever came to social revolution”.103 The 
fear of 808 mutiny which marked government policy-making after World 
War I also 809 significantly shaped official decisions towards the end of 
World War II. 810 “The spectres of mutiny and social unrest, vividly recalled 
from 1919”, 811 writes Addison, “were never far from the minds of the 
authorities”.104 812 Rex Pope also highlights the very careful management of 
demobilization 813 policy, and shows how the potential volatility of 
demobilization thwarted 814 wider government aims in the immediate 
postwar situation, in this case 815 maintaining a centrally planned labour 
force for controlled economic 816 reconstruction.
105 
The rise of nationalist 
movements in Asia and Africa 817 further increased tensions around 
demobilization, threatening to merge 818 with social revolutions and 
destabilize the imperial powers in their structural 819 dependency on colonial 
resources.
106 
820 
Anarchist sensitivity to the militarized features of the British state in 821 
the 1940s meant that they were primed and ready to pluck at the raw nerves 
822 of the political elite regarding the contentious process of large-scale 823 
demobilization. One of the convicted Freedom Press editors, Philip 824 
Sansom, imprisoned after the trial, recorded his impressions of the tense 825 
atmosphere surrounding demobilization and the acute official anxieties 826 
around slipping military discipline: “Once we got inside”, he recalled “we 
827 found the nicks full to overflowing” with soldiers sentenced to long terms 
828 of imprisonment by military courts for desertion and related offences. 829 
“None of this was known to the people at home”, wrote Sansom, adding, 830 
with significant emphasis, “[b]ut the government knew it!”.107 831 
There was indeed a pervasive fear of mutiny within government after 832 
World War II. Recent work by Allport has made it clear that, towards the 833 
end of the war, “[t]here was real fear that mass unrest would result if 834 
demobilisation was not handled well”.108 Lord Woolton, who served war- 835 
time roles as Minister of Food and Minister of Reconstruction, attests to 836 
103. Lamb, Mutinies: 1917–1920, p. 9. 
104. Addison, Now the War is Over, p. 19. 
105. Rex Pope, “Looking Back: The Experience of 1917–20 and the Planning of British 
Demobilisation, Decontrol and Reconstruction after World War II”, Northwest Journal of 
Historical Studies, 2:2 (1992), pp. 65–81, 65. See also idem, “British Demobilization after the 
Second World War”, p. 67. 
106. Silver, Forces of Labour, p. 148. 
107. Philip Sansom, “Revived 45: Anarchists against the Army”, The Raven Anarchist Quarterly, 
29, 8:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 61–71, 62. 108. Allport, Demobbed, p. 6. 
 
this anxiety in his diary entry for 1 November 1940: “I think there is going 837 
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to be grave trouble”, he fretted, “and the danger is that if the machine of 838 
government which can spend money so recklessly in engaging in war, fails 839 
to be equally reckless in rebuilding, there will be both the tendency and the 840 
excuse for revolution”.109 In May 1945 Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, 841 
109. Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Lord Woolton, diary entry for 
1 November 1940, Woolton MS 2, quoted in Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain 1945–51 
(London, 2006), p. 163. 
110 
warned his 
colleagues of potential chaos in the services. In the eyes of 842 senior 
Home Office personnel, the anarchists’ apparent efforts to stir up 843 
demobilizing soldiers’ feelings against the establishment might have met 844 
with some success. As Allport writes, “[d]isillusioned and resentful, 845 ex-
servicemen would, it was feared, be easy prey for extremists bearing false 846 
promises”.111 847 
In the event, in “one of the largest acts of collective indiscipline in British 
848 military history”, there were a significant number of protests, mutinies, 
and 849 “demob strikes” that challenged military authority after World War 
II, 850 particularly in India and the Middle East. In fact, as Silver notes, the 
851 intensity and duration of the post-World-War-II wave of labour unrest in 
852 colonial and post-colonial arenas was far higher and longer than the post- 
853 World-War-I wave, an important social revolutionary message from the 
854 decolonizing non-Western world.
112 
In the tense atmosphere building up 
to 855 these events, British officials decided to reverse their policy towards 
the 856 Freedom Group’s subversive publication, risking controversy by 
pursuing 857 a prosecution that would silence their anti-militarist polemic. 858 
 CONCLUSION 859 
This article has attempted to clarify the positions taken by the government 
860 and the anarchists in the course of the events leading to the prosecution 
and 861 trial of the editors of War Commentary in 1945 by placing them in 
wider 862 political and economic contexts. It casts an unfamiliar light on the 
rela- 863 tionship between state and society in the final stages of the war and 
in the 864 immediate postwar period, highlighting the official perception of 
anarchist 865 anti-militarist polemic as potentially incendiary in a context of 
an increas- 866 ingly hostile civil response to the militarization of life. 867 
The actions of the Freedom Press group and the government were 868 
embedded in the British social experience of war and in the international 869 
dynamics of relations between capital and labour, demonstrating the extent 
870 to which radicalism and dissent has been enmeshed in the dynamics of 871 
world politics and war. The experience of World War I had shown that a 872 
militarized establishment has reason to be particularly concerned about the 
873 end of wars, especially when they involved conscripted personnel. The 874 
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focus of government concern towards the end of the war was the break- 875 
down of military regulation and official sources of authority as the soldiers 
876 reclaimed their civilian identities. It is at this moment that the seemingly 
877 
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insignificant group, hitherto regarded as unthreatening, caused serious 878 
enough concern for the Home Office to decide to take action. 879 
Similarly, for the anarchists, the emerging prospect of demobilization was 880 
the precipitous moment for accelerating their anti-militarist polemic, par- 881 
ticularly targeting soldiers. Their rhetoric drew on key anarchist ideological 882 
points concerning militarism and social order. They were well-placed 883 
ideologically to address many of the anxieties and aspirations among both 884 
civilians and soldiers, by consistently associating government military 885 
policy with the experiences of violence and dislocation during war. In terms 886 
of British social history, the trial of the anarchists invites us to re-examine 887 
the impact of military experience on the civilian population in Britain and 888 
widen the “welfarist”, “consensus” paradigm, by which relations between 889 
society and the government of the period have traditionally been viewed. 890 
 
